Bomb attacks on civil aviation make detecting improvised explosive devices and explosive material in passenger baggage a major concern. In the last few years, explosive detection systems for cabin baggage screening (EDSCB) have become available. Although used by a number of airports, most countries have not yet implemented these systems on a wide scale. We investigated the benefits of EDSCB with two different levels of automation currently being discussed by regulators and airport operators: automation as a diagnostic aid with an on-screen alarm resolution by the airport security officer (screener) or EDSCB with an automated decision by the machine. The two experiments reported here tested and compared both scenarios and a condition without automation as baseline. Participants were screeners at two international airports who differed in both years of work experience and familiarity with automation aids. Results showed that experienced screeners were good at detecting improvised explosive devices even without EDSCB. EDSCB increased only their detection of bare explosives. In contrast, screeners with less experience (tenure < 1 year) benefitted substantially from EDSCB in detecting both improvised explosive devices and bare explosives. A comparison of all three conditions showed that automated decision provided better human-machine detection performance than on-screen alarm resolution and no automation. This came at the cost of slightly higher false alarm rates on the human-machine system level, which would still be acceptable from an operational point of view. Results indicate that a wide-scale implementation of EDSCB would increase the detection of explosives in passenger bags and automated decision instead of automation as diagnostic aid with on screen alarm resolution should be considered.
Introduction
Secure air transportation is vital for both the economy and society (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008) . For several decades now, airplanes have been interesting targets for terrorists (Baum, 2016) . Looking at the history of attacks against airplanes (both successful and near misses), one of the biggest concerns is bombs -that is, improvised explosive devices (IEDs; Novakoff, 1993; Singh and Singh, 2003; Baum, 2016) . The Global Terrorism Database (2017) lists 893 attacks on airports or aircrafts with explosives, 247 of which occurred after 2001. Quite recently, on the 29th of July 2017, a terrorist plot was prevented at Sydney airport when an IED was found concealed inside a bag (Westbrook and Barrett, 2017) . In response to heightened risk, especially since 9/11, airports and governments have increased their investments in aviation security (Gillen and Morrison, 2015) . In the last few years, explosive detection systems for cabin baggage screening (EDSCB) have also become available (Sterchi and Schwaninger, 2015) . Whereas a few countries such as the United States are using these systems (Neffenger, 2015) , they have not been implemented widely in European countries and on other continents (Pochet, 2016) . We investigated the benefits of EDSCB with two different levels of automation that are both being discussed currently by regulators and airport operators. We were able to recruit airport security officers (screeners) from two different European airports to work on two experiments using a simulated cabin baggage screening task. In this introduction, we first summarize previous research on visual inspection and conventional cabin baggage screening before going on to discuss automation and EDSCB.
Visual inspection and conventional cabin baggage screening
To prevent terrorist attacks and other acts of unlawful interference, passengers and their belongings have to be screened before they are allowed to enter the secure areas of airports and board airplanes (Thomas, 2009) . Screeners visually inspect X-ray images of cabin baggage for prohibited items such as guns, knives, and improvised 
Automation and human-machine system performance
Automation refers to functions performed by machines (usually computers) that assist or replace tasks performed by humans (for reviews, see Parasuraman and Wickens, 2008; Sheridan, 2011; Vagia et al., 2016) . One form of automation assisting humans is the diagnostic aid (Wickens and Dixon, 2007) . This provides support in the form of alerts or alarms and influences attention allocation (Cullen et al., 2013) . Examples include collision warning systems for driving and air traffic control (Lehto et al., 2000; Abe and Richardson, 2006; Liu and Jhuang, 2012; Biondi et al., 2017) or aids assisting radiologists in making diagnostic decisions from mammograms (e.g. Vyborny et al., 2000; Fenton et al., 2007) . Other examples are systems that indicate potentially threatening objects in X-ray images of passenger baggage. These systems have been investigated in laboratory studies with student participants (Wiegmann et al., 2006; Rice and McCarley, 2011) . Common to this type of automation is that it categorizes events into target or non-target states (Wickens and Dixon, 2007) . Signal detection theory Swets, 1966, 1972 ) provides a useful framework with which to describe the performance (reliability) of such diagnostic automation (Wickens and Dixon, 2007; Parasuraman and Wickens, 2008; Rice and McCarley, 2011) . In signal detection theory, high performance (reliability) in terms of d' is achieved when targets are detected well (high hit rate) and the false alarm rate is low. The criterion (or response bias) is a threshold that can be changed while d' remains constant (Macmillan and Creelman, 2005) . The criterion can be changed by adjusting thresholds for alerts, resulting in a trade-off between two types of automation errors: misses and false alarms (Parasuraman, 1987; Parasuraman and Riley, 1997; Wickens and Colcombe, 2007) . Designers often set low thresholds, because the consequences of automation misses are considered to be more costly than false alarms (Parasuraman and Wickens, 2008) . However, if the base rate of dangerous events to be detected is low, the result will be many false alarms and only few hits (Parasuraman and Riley, 1997) .
This can produce a 'cry wolf' effect with operators ignoring system warnings (Breznitz, 1983; Bliss, 2003) . Such an effect can drastically reduce or even eliminate the benefits of automation when it is implemented as a diagnostic aid.
Alongside automation as a diagnostic aid, other levels of automation are possible. Sheridan and Verplank (1978) proposed a taxonomy with 10 levels of automation ranging from fully manual to fully computer automated. Parasuraman et al. (2000) proposed a taxonomy with four processing stages: 1) sensory processing, 2) perception/working memory, 3) decision making, and 4) response/action. Several other taxonomies for different levels of automation have been proposed (for a review, see Vagia et al., 2016) . Kaber and Endsley (2003) have pointed out that specifying the 'best' level of automation is not as straightforward as one might think. Moreover, familiarity with automation can affect how people interact with it (Parasuraman and Manzey, 2010; Sauer et al., 2016; Strauch, 2016; Sauer and Chavaillaz, 2017) . Indeed, deciding how best to organize human-machine function allocation and the level of automation remains a difficult task that can also depend on the specific application (Sheridan, 2011) . Parasuraman et al. (2000) have suggested that appropriate criteria for selecting the level of automation for a particular application are human performance, automation reliability, and the cost associated with outcomes.
Automation and EDSCB
For X-ray screening of cabin baggage, regulators and airport operators are currently discussing two EDSCB implementation scenarios differing in their level of automation and human-machine function allocation: on-screen alarm resolution (OSAR) and automated decision (Sterchi and Schwaninger, 2015) . In the OSAR scenario, automation is implemented as a diagnostic aid. Screeners visually inspect every piece of cabin baggage. During this inspection, EDSCB indicates potential explosive material by either marking an area on the X-ray image of a passenger bag with a coloured rectangle or highlighting it in a special colour (Nabiev and Palkina, 2017) . Screeners then have to resolve this; that is, they have to visually inspect the X-ray image and decide whether the area indicated by the machine is harmless (EDSCB false alarm) or whether it actually could be explosive material, making it necessary to subject the baggage to a secondary inspection. This is also conducted at the airport security checkpoint and involves explosive trace detection, opening the bag, and manually searching it (Sterchi and Schwaninger, 2015) . EDSCB systems with high hit rates (close to 90%) have false alarm rates in the range of 15-20% (personal communication with EDSCB experts, summer 2016). As mentioned above, system reliability can be described by d' from signal detection theory Swets, 1966, 1972) . For example, an EDSCB with a hit rate of 88% and a false alarm rate of 17% would have a system reliability of d' = 2.1. In operation, most of the EDSCB alarms are cleared by screeners, leaving only a small percentage of bags on which EDSCB has raised an alarm that then requires a secondary inspection. Although OSAR is the scenario currently employed at airports that have already introduced EDSCB, its effectiveness can be questioned, because screeners might not be able to distinguish explosive material from benign material (as pointed out already by Jones, 2003) . Moreover, EDSCB false alarm rates of 15-20% could result in a cry wolf effect leading screeners to potentially ignore system warnings (Breznitz, 1983; Bliss, 2003) . Screeners might therefore be prone to mistakenly clearing bags that contain explosives. This would drastically reduce the effectiveness of EDSCB in the OSAR scenario. In other words, the probability of detecting explosives on the human-machine system level equals about 90% (EDSCB) minus the erroneously cleared alarms by screeners. This could result in a much lower detection rate.
The automated decision scenario uses a higher level of automation with different human-machine function allocation. Bags on which the EDSCB raises an alarm are sent automatically to secondary inspection using manual search and/or explosive trace detection (Sterchi and Schwaninger, 2015) . Because secondary inspection is time-consuming, EDSCB false alarm rates of 15-20% are not acceptable in this scenario. To be operationally feasible, EDSCB thresholds can be adjusted, which corresponds to moving the criterion in signal detection theory (Green and Swets, 1966; Macmillan and Creelman, 2005) . For example, given a system reliability of d' = 2.1, like that in the OSAR scenario explained above, adjusting EDSCB thresholds to achieve a false alarm rate of 4% would result in an EDSCB hit rate of 63%. It is important to remember that in the automated decision scenario, screeners visually inspect all Xray images on which the EDSCB does not raise an alarm. In the current example, this equals 96% of all bags (assuming a false alarm rate of the EDSCB of 4%). The probability of detecting explosives on the human-machine system level therefore equals 63% (EDSCB hit rate) plus detections by screeners on the 96% of bags on which the EDSCB has not raised an alarm. Therefore, in this example, the probability of detecting explosives on the human-machine system level equals 63% (EDSCB) plus the detections by screeners.
In summary, for a given EDSCB, the effectiveness of OSAR and the automated decision scenario depends finally on the screeners' ability to clear alarms by the EDSCB (in the OSAR scenario) and to detect explosives missed by the EDSCB (in both scenarios). Which scenario results in better human-machine system performance is difficult to predict and well worth investigating.
Present study
The present study examined the benefits of automated explosive detection systems for cabin baggage screening (EDSCB) in two realistic implementation scenarios differing in the level of automation and human-machine function allocation (EDSCB with OSAR vs automated decision). It addressed the following three research questions: 1) Does EDSCB lead to higher human-machine system performance for detecting IEDs and explosives? 2) Does this depend on the level of automation (OSAR vs automated decision)? 3) Is this dependent on screener work experience? To address these research questions, two experiments using a simulated baggage screening were conducted at different European airports with screeners differing in work experience.
Based on previous research, we derived three hypotheses: 1) EDSCB should improve human-machine system performance for detecting bare explosives because these often look like a harmless organic mass (Jones, 2003) . 2) We expected better results for the automated decision scenario compared to OSAR, because clearing EDSCB alarms can be difficult (Jones, 2003) and false alarm rates of 15-20% in the OSAR scenario may result in a cry wolf effect with screeners ignoring system warnings (Breznitz, 1983; Bliss, 2003) . 3) Effects should depend on screener work experience because previous research has shown that regular computer-based training, which is mandatory in Europe, results in large increases in IED detection during the first few years (Halbherr et al., 2013) . Experiment 1 examined the first two hypotheses. The aims of Experiment 2 were to perform a replication, to address the limitations of Experiment 1, and to test all three hypotheses. The current research complied with the American Psychological Association Code of Ethics and was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Applied Sciences and Arts Northwestern Switzerland. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. The study was conducted with 61 screeners who had been qualified, trained, and certified according to the standards set by the appropriate national authority (civil aviation administration) in compliance with the relevant EU Regulation (Commission Implementing Regulation [EU] , 2015/1998). Screeners had been employed for at least two years (M = 7.68, SD = 4.85) and were not familiar with automation aids for cabin baggage screening. They participated on a voluntary basis, were recruited by a security service provider at the airport, and compensated by regular salary. Their average age 1 was 42.5 years (SD = 10.52, range 24-60 years), and 57.37% of them were female.
Design
The experiment used a between-subjects design with condition (no automation as baseline, OSAR, and automated decision) as independent variable and hit rate (percentage detection of prohibited items) and false alarm rate of the human-machine system as dependent variables. The three experimental groups were balanced with regard to their detection performance score in a pre-test (X-ray CAT), age, and work experience (baseline, n = 20; OSAR, n = 20; automated decision, n = 21).
Materials
Pre-test: The X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT) is a reliable, valid, and standardized computer-based test used to assess the X-ray image interpretation competency of screeners (Koller and Schwaninger, 2006) . It has been applied in several previous studies and is used for the mandatory X-ray screener certification at a number of European airports (e.g. Koller et al., 2008; Michel et al., 2007; Koller et al., 2009; Steiner-Koller et al., 2009; Halbherr et al., 2013) . To solve the X-Ray CAT, screeners have to visually scan X-ray images for prohibited items and decide whether a bag can be considered either to be harmless (OK) or to contain a prohibited object (NOT OK). For a more detailed description of the X-Ray CAT, see Koller and Schwaninger (2006) .
Main test: We measured human-machine system performance in the three automation conditions (baseline, OSAR, and automated decision) with 640 unique X-ray images of real passenger bags. These were selected by two experts (former screeners) from a pool of about 2000 Xray images recorded during regular airport security screening operations. This selection procedure included making sure that no prohibited items were contained in the X-ray images. Target-present images were created by the screening experts using previously recorded prohibited items that were placed into 80 of the 640 X-ray images using a softwareand image-merging algorithm that had been validated in previous studies (von Bastian et al., 2009; Mendes et al., 2011) . This corresponds to a target prevalence of 12.5%. Five different threat categories were included in this test: IEDs, explosive materials, guns, gun parts, and knives (see Fig. 1 
for examples).
The category gun parts was included to compare detection performance with explosives because the latter are parts of IEDs. Each category contained eight different prohibited items. As in the X-Ray CAT (Koller and Schwaninger, 2006) , each item was depicted twice: once from an easier, canonical viewpoint, and once from a more difficult, rotated viewpoint. Fig. 2 illustrates the three automation conditions. In the baseline condition ( Fig. 2a) , no automation is available and detecting prohibited items relies only on the screener. In the OSAR condition, automation is implemented as a diagnostic aid and red frames highlight areas in the X-ray image on which the EDSCB has raised an alarm (Fig. 2b) . For the OSAR condition, an EDSCB was emulated by showing a red frame around 14 of the 16 IEDs and explosives and around 94 of the 560 images of harmless bags. The frames on the images were set manually by a screening expert and were based on available information and professional experience with existing EDSCB machines. The emulated EDSCB had a hit rate of 88% and an alarm rate of 17% (as mentioned in the introduction, EDSCB systems in service at airports using OSAR have hit rates close to 90% and false alarm rates of 15-20%).
For the automated decision condition, a set of images of 10 IEDs, 10
1 One X-ray screener did not report her or his age.
explosives, and 20 harmless bags was randomly selected from the set of images with an alarm in the OSAR condition. These images were then removed ( Fig. 2c ) from the test (in order to emulate the implementation scenario in which bags that trigger an alarm by the EDS are sent directly to secondary inspection). The emulated EDS had a hit rate of 63% and a false alarm rate of 4%. This corresponds to the same system reliability of the EDS in terms of d' with a more conservative criterion (a requirement of the automated decision scenario, as explained in the introduction).
Procedure
All screeners came to the test facilities to conduct the pre-test (XRay CAT) and completed the main test on a second test date (mean interval between tests: 53 days, SD = 11). For the tests, eight laptops were set up in a normally lit room. Screeners sat approximately 60 cm away from the laptop screen. The X-ray images covered about twothirds of the screen. Before starting the test, screeners were given general instructions on the number of images, the target prevalence, and the different prohibited item categories. They performed the test quietly, individually, and under supervision.
Screeners were instructed to inspect each image visually and report as quickly and accurately as possible whether a bag was harmless (OK) or not (NOT OK) by clicking on a button on the screen. In the OSAR condition, screeners were informed that they would be receiving support from an EDSCB that usually marks IEDs and explosives with a red frame. They were further instructed that red frames can also occur when the bag contains no IED or explosive (false alarm). In the automated decision condition, screeners were informed that this test condition would include support from an automated explosives detection system. They were told that if an IED or an explosive is detected by the EDSCB, the bag will be sent automatically to secondary inspection and will not be shown to the screener. They were further informed that in some cases, IEDs and explosives will not be detected by the EDSCB. After the instructions, all participants practiced on 20 sample images to familiarize themselves with the images and the task.
Following the European Commission (Commission Implementing Regulation [EU] , 2015/1998) regulation, screeners have to take a break of at least 10 min after 20 min of continuous visual inspection of X-ray images. Therefore, the EDSCB test was divided into four equally long blocks, and screeners were asked to take a 10-min break after completing each block. Threat bags, threat categories, and harmless bags were distributed equally across the four blocks. The order of blocks was counter-balanced between conditions to minimize any training or order effects. Within a block, images appeared in random order. All participants completed the pre-test (X-Ray CAT) in less than 40 min and the main test in less than 2 h including breaks.
Analyses
All ANOVAs were conducted with SPSS version 22 and alpha was set at 0.05 unless otherwise stated. Post hoc comparisons were conducted with R version 3.22 (R Core Team, 2015) and Holm-Bonferroni corrections were applied (Holm, 1979) . Effect sizes of ANOVAs are reported with η p 2 (partial eta-squared); effect sizes of t tests, with Cohen's d. ANOVAs were calculated using the hit and false alarm rate on the human-machine system level as dependent variables. Because hit and false alarm rates are bound between 0 and 1, normality and homogeneity of variances was generally not fully met. Traditionally, ANOVAs are assumed to be quite robust towards non-normality and homogeneity (e.g. Glass et al., 1972) . However, because reviews question this robustness (Harwell et al., 1992; Erceg-Hurn and Mirosevich, 2008) , all ANOVAs were also performed on scores that had been arcsine transformed for homogenization of variances and normalization (for more information on the application of arcsine transformations to proportion data, see McDonald, 2007) . Results on transformed values are reported only when the transformation affected whether an effect attained significance.
Results
Fig . 3 shows the results of human-machine hit rate by prohibited item category and automation condition.
First, we conducted a univariate ANOVA with the hit rate of only the baseline condition. This revealed a significant effect of prohibited item category, F(4, 76) = 83.03, p < .001, η p 2 = 0.81. Post hoc analyses revealed a significant effect between all category comparisons for prohibited items (p < .017) except for the comparison between knives and explosives (p = .365). Then, we conducted a 3 (prohibited item category: gun, gun parts, and knives) x 3 (condition: baseline, OSAR, and automated decision) ANOVA. We found no main effect of automation, F(2, 58) = 1.05, p = .356, η p 2 = 0.03, and no interaction between prohibited item category and condition, F(3.45, 100.05) = 0.63, p = .622, η p 2 = 0.02. To examine the benefits of EDSCB, we conducted a 2 (IED and explosives) x 3 (condition: baseline, OSAR, and automated decision) ANOVA. This revealed main effects for the prohibited item category, F(1, 58) = 238.89, p < .001, η p 2 = 0.80, condition, F(2, 58) = 34.74, p < .001, η p 2 = 0.55, and their interaction, F(2, 58) = 37.06, p < .001, η p 2 = 0.56. For IEDs, there was a significant difference between OSAR and automated decision (p = .041) in favor of the automated decision condition. For explosives, direct post hoc comparisons showed a significant difference between the baseline condition and the automated decision condition (p < .001) as well as Fig. 1 . Examples of the five threat categories. Fig. 2 . Illustration of the three automation conditions: (a) baseline condition without automation, (b) OSAR, and (c) automated decision.
N. Hättenschwiler et al. Applied Ergonomics 72 (2018) 58-68 between OSAR and automated decision (p < .001).
Further analyses were conducted with the false alarm rate of the human-machine system as a dependent variable. A univariate ANOVA revealed a significant effect of condition, F(2, 58) = 12.41, p < .001, η p 2 = 0.30. Post hoc pairwise comparisons using Holm-Bonferroni corrections revealed a significant difference between the baseline condition and automated decision (p = .008) as well as between OSAR and automated decision (p < .001). The false alarm rate in the automated decision condition was significantly higher than the false alarm rates in the two other conditions (see Fig. 4 ). We further analysed whether automated decision affected human-machine system performance only through its direct contribution (i.e. producing hits and false alarms) or whether it also affected human performance. Therefore, the detection scores for images of IEDs and explosives shown to screeners in the automated decision condition (i.e. not sorted out by the automation aid) were compared with the detection scores for the same images from the baseline condition. Images that triggered the EDS alarm in the automated decision condition were excluded from this analysis for both conditions. Independent t tests were calculated for the hit rate for IEDs and for the hit rate for explosives. There were no significant effects for either IEDs, t(39) = 0.40, p = .689, or explosives, t(39) = 0.34, p = .732. Another t test was conducted with false alarm rate as the dependent variable. This revealed no difference between conditions, t(39) = 0.64, p = .525. In conclusion, it can be assumed that automated decision did not influence human performance.
Discussion
The results for the baseline condition replicated those found in previous studies: guns were detected very well, IEDs only slightly less well, and knives came third Halbherr et al., 2013) . Gun parts were more difficult to detect than whole guns, presumably because configural representations of whole gun shapes cannot be accessed and only component representations of gun parts are available for recognition (Schwaninger, 2004) . Explosives were difficult to detect, which could be due to the fact that they lack the diagnostic features of an IED and because explosive material often looks like a harmless organic mass (Jones, 2003) . Automation had no impact on the detection of guns, gun parts, and knives. This is not surprising, because automation highlighted only potential explosives.
The screeners in Experiment 1 did not benefit from automation when OSAR was used with a realistically high false alarm rate of 17%. This is consistent with results found in earlier studies using different tasks indicating that automation with high false alarms can induce a cry wolf effect with operators ignoring system warnings (Bliss et al., 1995; Parasuraman et al., 2000) . Results revealed a highly significant difference between the baseline condition and the automated decision condition -but only for explosives. Because the screeners' performance on detecting IEDs was already very high without the automated system (baseline), not much room was left for improvement. In Experiment 1, automated decision provided benefits only for the detection of explosives. This came at the cost of a higher false alarm rate, because all EDS alarms that are false alarms automatically add to the false alarms of screeners.
Experiment 2
The aims of Experiment 2 were to replicate Experiment 1 with screeners from a different airport, to address the limitations of Fig. 3 . Mean human-machine hit rates by condition (baseline, OSAR, automated decision) and prohibited item categories (guns, gun parts, knives, IEDs, and explosives). Absolute values of hit rate are not shown due to security restrictions in this project. Error bars are ± one standard error. Fig. 4 . Mean human-machine false alarm rates by condition (baseline, OSAR, and automated decision). Error bars are ± one standard error.
Experiment 1, and to test all three hypotheses.
The following limitations of Experiment 1 were addressed in Experiment 2: as described in the introduction, familiarity with automation can affect how people interact with it (Parasuraman and Manzey, 2010; Sauer et al., 2016; Strauch, 2016) . Therefore, Experiment 2 was conducted at an international airport with screeners who were familiar with automation (this airport used EDSCB as diagnostic aid and screeners were familiar with OSAR). Moreover, screeners with less work experience and training might benefit when it comes to detecting IEDs and explosives in the OSAR condition due to their lower baseline performance (Halbherr et al., 2013) . Therefore, Experiment 2 was conducted with two screener groups: experienced screeners (tenure > 1.5 years) and less experienced screeners (tenure < 1 year).
Experiment 2 addressed all three hypotheses: 1) As in Experiment 1, EDSCB should improve human-machine system performance for detecting bare explosives because these often look like a harmless organic mass (Jones, 2003) . 2) We again expected better results for the automated decision scenario compared to OSAR, because clearing EDSCB alarms can be difficult (Jones, 2003) and because false alarm rates of 15-20% in the OSAR scenario may result in a cry wolf effect with screeners ignoring system warnings (Breznitz, 1983; Bliss, 2003) . 3) Extending Experiment 1, we hypothesized for Experiment 2 that effects should depend on screener work experience because previous research has shown that regular computer-based training, which is mandatory in Europe, results in large increases of IED detection in the first few years (Halbherr et al., 2013) .
Method

Participants
Experiment 2 was conducted with 77 screeners from another international European airport who were familiar with automation aids. As in Experiment 1, they had been qualified, trained, and certified according to the standards set by the appropriate national authority in compliance with the relevant EU Regulation (Commission Implementing Regulation [EU] , 2015/1998). The screeners participated on a voluntary basis, were recruited by a security service provider at the airport, and compensated by regular salary. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. Group 1 (44 screeners, 14 females) was as well-trained and experienced as the screeners in Experiment 1 (years of work experience: M = 8.45 years, SD = 5.66). Their average age was 36.55 years (SD = 8.46, range 21-53 years). Group 2 (33 screeners, 19 females) had less work experience and training (less than one year). Their average age was 30.81 years (SD = 10.93, range 18-53 2 years).
Design
The experiment used a mixed design with condition (baseline, OSAR, automated decision) and years of work experience (tenure > 1.5 years or tenure < 1 year) as between-subjects independent variables and threat categories as within-subjects independent variables. The dependent variables were the hit rate (percentage detection of prohibited items) and false alarm rate of the human-machine system. As in Experiment 1, the three experimental groups were balanced according to their detection performance score in the pre-test (X-ray CAT) and the variables age and work experience within both tenure groups (> 1.5 years or < 1 year; baseline, tenure < 1: n = 10, tenure > 1.5: n = 14; OSAR, tenure < 1: n = 11, tenure > 1.5: n = 15; automated decision, tenure < 1: n = 12, tenure > 1.5: n = 15).
Materials, procedure, and statistics
The same tests and procedure were used as in Experiment 1. All participants completed the pre-test in less than 40 min and the main test in less than 2 h including breaks. The mean interval between the pretest and the main test was 82.86 days (SD = 6.65). The same statistics were used as in Experiment 1.
Results
The same analyses were conducted as in Experiment 1 but with tenure as an additional between-subject factor. Fig. 5 shows human-machine system hit rates for both tenure groups by category and automation condition.
A two-way ANOVA on hit rates for the baseline condition with prohibited item category (guns, gun parts, knives, IEDs, and explosives) as within-subjects factor and work experience (tenure > 1.5 years vs. tenure < 1 year) as between-subjects factor revealed significant main To rule out an effect of condition on the categories gun, gun parts, and knives, we calculated a 3 (prohibited item category: gun, gun parts, and knives) x 3 (condition: baseline, OSAR, and automated decision) x 2 (work experience: tenure > 1.5 years vs tenure < 1 year) ANOVA. This revealed no significant effect for condition, F(2, 71) = 0.50, p = .610, but a significant effect for work experience, F(1, 71) = 8.07, p = .006, η p 2 = 0.10. This indicated that experienced screeners had a better detection performance on these three categories. Surprisingly, the interaction between category and condition was also significant, F (3.88, 137.66) = 2.51, p = .047, η p 2 = 0.07. However, when we used the arcsine transformed scores, this effect no longer attained significance, F(3.79, 134.57) = 2.37, p = .059. Furthermore, a 2 (categories: IEDs and explosives) x 3 (condition: baseline, OSAR, and automated decision) x 2 (work experience: tenure > 1.5 years vs tenure < 1 year) ANOVA for the hit rate revealed a significant effect of category, F(1, 71) = 109.50, p < .001, This shows that the effect of automation did not just depend on prohibited item category, but that this dependency also related to work experience.
In our next step, we calculated post hoc pairwise comparisons between the conditions within each screener group for IEDs and explosives separately. For IEDs, the less experienced screeners revealed a significant difference between the baseline condition and OSAR (p = .039) as well as between the baseline and automated decision (p < .001). In contrast, no comparison on the detection of IEDs was significant for experienced screeners. For explosives, there was a significant effect for the less experienced screeners between the baseline condition and automated decision (p < .001) as well as between OSAR and automated decision (p < .001). The same effects were found to be significant (p < .001) for explosives in experienced screeners.
Further analyses were conducted with false alarm rate as the dependent variable (see Fig. 6 ). A 3 (condition: baseline, OSAR, and automated decision) x 2 (work experience: tenure > 1.5 years vs tenure < 1 year) ANOVA revealed a significant effect for condition, F(2, 71) = 4.043, p = .022, η p 2 = 0.10, but not for either work experience, F(1, 71) = 2.19, p = .143, or the interaction between work experience and condition, F(2, 71) = 0.268, p = .76. Moreover, post hoc pairwise comparisons within each screener group showed no significant difference between any two automation conditions. Effect of OSAR. As reported above, the appearance of frames increased the hit rate for IEDs in less experienced screeners. Although there was no statistically significant increase in the false alarm rate between the baseline and OSAR condition, this does not mean per se that OSAR does not affect the false alarm rate in less experienced Fig. 6 . Mean human-machine false alarm rates by condition (baseline, OSAR, automated decision) and work experience (tenure < 1 year and tenure > 1.5 years). Error bars are ± one standard error. screeners (see Fig. 6 ). Therefore, it is worth investigating whether there was a change in the response bias of the screeners (tendency to respond with NOT OK to images with frames) that can explain the increased hit rate for IEDs. In a next step, we compared the response bias c and the associated sensitivity measure d' (derived from signal detection theory using log-linear correction; Macmillan and Creelman, 2005) for IEDs between the baseline and OSAR condition in the less experienced screeners. This revealed an increase in both response bias, t (18.33) = 2.68, p = .015, d = 1.18, and sensitivity d', t (17.89) = −2.49, p = .023, d = 1.07. Therefore, the results imply that OSAR leads to a higher sensitivity for detecting IEDs but is also responsible for a shift in response bias in less experienced screeners (see Fig. 7 ).
As in Experiment 1, we also tested whether human performance was affected by the implementation of automated decision by comparing only the images analysed by participants in both the baseline and automated decision condition. For the dependent variables hit rate for IEDs and hit rate for explosives, we calculated independent t tests separately for both experienced and less experienced screeners. Comparable to Experiment 1, automated explosives detection did not affect the detection of IEDs and explosives (p > .182). The same comparisons were made for false alarm rates, revealing no significant effects for either tenure group (tenure < 1 year: t[20] = 0.27, p = .789; tenure > 1.5 years: t[27] = 0.15, p = .880).
Discussion
In the baseline condition, the same results were found for welltrained and experienced screeners as in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 replicated the results from Experiment 1 while additionally revealing that screeners with less experience and training showed a lower detection of prohibited items than experienced screeners. This is consistent with previous research on the visual inspection of X-ray images without automation aids (Schwaninger and Hofer, 2004; Koller et al. 2008 Koller et al. , 2009 Halbherr et al., 2013; Schuster et al., 2013) . In the OSAR condition, results were as follows: as in Experiment 1, automation as a diagnostic aid (OSAR) did not increase detection performance for the experienced screeners in Experiment 2, despite their previous familiarity with such aids. The less experienced screeners detected more IEDs in the condition with OSAR, which was partly due to an increase in sensitivity and partly to a shift in response bias. The detection of explosives did not improve through OSAR. The use of automated decision resulted in the highest detection of explosives in both experienced and less experienced screeners. Less experienced screeners also detected the most IEDs in this condition, whereas it did not lead to any significant increase in experienced screeners. This was probably due to their already high level of performance as shown in the baseline condition. Regarding efficiency, results were consistent with Experiment 1; that is, automated decision resulted in a higher false alarm rate of the human-machine system, because screeners could not clear EDSCB alarms in this condition.
General discussion
This study examined the use of automation for the airport security screening of cabin baggage by testing two levels of automation that are currently being discussed by regulators and airport operators: on-screen alarm resolution (OSAR) and automated decision (Sterchi and Schwaninger, 2015) . In the OSAR scenario, automated explosive detection systems for cabin baggage screening (EDSCB) assist airport security officers (screeners) by highlighting areas that could be explosive in X-ray images. This type of automation influences attention allocation and is comparable to diagnostic aiding used in other domains (Wickens and Dixon, 2007; Cullen et al., 2013) . The automated decision scenario uses a higher level of automation and different human function allocation. Bags on which the EDSCB raises an alarm are sent automatically to secondary inspection, which involves manual search and/or explosive trace detection (Sterchi and Schwaninger, 2015) . A simulated baggage screening task was used in two experiments with screeners working at two European airports who varied in their work experience. As expected, human-machine system performance varied between the two scenarios. In the following, we discuss both implementation scenarios in terms of their human-machine system performance.
Automation as diagnostic aid (OSAR)
Previous research has shown that fully functional improvised explosive devices (IEDs) can be detected very well by experienced and trained screeners even without automation (Schwaninger and Hofer, 2004; Koller et al., 2008 Koller et al., , 2009 Halbherr et al., 2013) . However, detecting bare explosives proves to be a challenge even for experienced screeners, because they often look like a harmless organic mass (Jones, 2003) . Indeed, with automation as a diagnostic aid (OSAR), human-machine hit rates for bare explosives were similar to the baseline condition without automation. This is remarkable when it is considered that for OSAR, the EDSCB has a hit rate of 88% for explosives. In other words, using automation as a diagnostic aid, which means that screeners have to resolve EDSCB alarms, drastically reduces or even eliminates the benefits of EDSCB for detecting bare explosives.
However, the OSAR scenario is beneficial for the detection of IEDs but only for the less experienced screeners. We argue that the automation system with OSAR assists in the search component of X-ray image inspection by guiding attention (Cullen et al., 2013) to the relevant area -the first processing stage of sensory processing in the taxonomy proposed by Parasuraman et al. (2000) . OSAR can further assist by providing relevant information and therefore support the decision component (i.e. an X-ray image that triggers an alarm is more likely to contain an IED or explosive). As explained, the main difference between IEDs and bare explosives is that screeners can learn to recognize IED components (triggering device, power source, detonator, and cables connecting these components to an explosive) in an X-ray image (Turner, 1994) . In the presence of these components, less experienced screeners are able to profit from the attentional guidance provided by OSAR and increase their hit rate. Our further investigation of the increased hit rate for IEDs revealed an increase in sensitivity and simultaneously a decrease in response bias. This suggests that the automation system affects not only the visual search component but also the decision component in the less experienced screeners' inspection.
But, why did experienced screeners not profit from attentional guidance through OSAR? First, experienced screeners already achieved high hit rates for IEDs in the baseline condition without automation and this thereby does not leave much room for improvement through OSAR. In addition, experienced screeners may also have judged their own ability to detect prohibited items to be superior to the automation support -a reason for noncompliance also reported in other domains (e.g. Moray, 1992, 1994) . However, as even experienced screeners could not profit from OSAR in regard to explosives, future research should explore whether specific training and familiarity with automation aids (Sauer et al., 2016) such as OSAR might provide screeners with a mental model of its capabilities. Such mental models could be crucial for an effective use of the automation aid (Strauch, 2016) . Moreover, the low target prevalence in our study and, therefore, the low base rate led to many false alarms (Parasuraman and Riley, 1997) . This probably led to a 'cry wolf' effect with experienced screeners, meaning that they might simply have ignored the system warnings (Breznitz, 1983; Bliss, 2003) . This problem should be even more pronounced in practice where real IEDs and explosives almost never occur and almost all EDSCB alarms are false.
Automation as automated decision
We expected better results for the automated decision scenario compared to OSAR, because clearing EDS alarms can be difficult (Jones, 2003) and the EDSCB false alarm rate of 17% in the OSAR scenario could result in a cry wolf effect with screeners ignoring system warnings (Breznitz, 1983; Bliss, 2003) . Indeed, in both experiments, we found that screeners did not achieve high hit rates for bare explosives. However, EDSCB with automated decision was able to compensate for this, leading to better human-machine hit rates in both airports and both tenure groups. This came at the expense of higher false alarm rates (an increase by ca. 4 percentage points) -a rate that is still operationally feasible.
Because there was no direct interaction between the automation system and the screener, it is not surprising that the automated decision did not affect screener performance. Hence, the observed increase in detection performance was determined by the amount of explosives missed by screeners but detected by the EDSCB. This also explains why the detection of IEDs improved significantly only in less experienced screeners. As shown in the baseline condition, experienced screeners already detected IEDs well, and this left little room for improvement through EDSCB. As expected, automated decision showed a higher false alarm rate. Assuming that screener performance remains unaffected by the implementation of an automated decision when applying different hit and false alarm rates to the ones tested in this study, system hit and false alarm rates can be manipulated directly by the choice of the EDSCB machine and the machine settings (criterion of the machine) for a given screener performance. It is important to remember that with the EDSCB threshold settings used in our experiments, humans (screeners) still have an important role. They visually inspect all X-ray images on which the EDSCB does not raise an alarm. This would be 96% of all Xray images in an operational environment (as the EDSCB alarms only on 4% of all bags).
Practical implications, limitations, and future research
Replication of psychological experiments is an important part of the scientific process -particularly in psychology (Rovenpor and Gonzales, 2015; Baker, 2016) . This is why we regard the replication aspect of Experiment 2 as a specific strength. However, in addition to the replication, the effects in Experiment 2 also depend on screener work experience, as to be expected from previous research showing that regular computer-based training results in large increases of IED detection in the first few years (Halbherr et al., 2013) .
Like most previous studies on visual inspection and automation, this study also uses laboratory experiments that simulate aspects of tasks that human operators conduct in the real world. Therefore, it is important to consider both the limitations of such simulations and their practical implications when discussing the similarities and differences between the baggage screening task used in this study and X-ray screening at airport security checkpoints. One difference is that airport security checkpoints are often noisy and stressful environments (Michel et al., 2014; Baeriswyl et al., 2016) . Research in other domains (e.g. Sauer et al., 2013) has found that operators prefer higher levels of automation under noise than in quiet conditions. If this also proves to be the case for cabin baggage screening, it would generate further evidence in favor of automated decision instead of diagnostic automation (OSARP). Another difference is target prevalence; that is, the base rate of target-present events (Wolfe et al., 2007) . In our study, one out of eight images contained a threat item and one out of 20 images either an IED or explosive. In practice, such threats are much less frequent. Assuming that airports conduct covert tests (Schwaninger, 2009 ) and use threat image projection, a technology that projects X-ray images containing threats during the routine X-ray screening operation , target prevalence would be about 2%. With regard to our findings, two expected effects of lower target prevalence need to be discussed. The first effect is that lower target prevalence probably leads to a shift in decision bias and therefore lower hit and false alarm rates in screeners (Wolfe et al., 2007 (Wolfe et al., , 2013 . If detection of IEDs by screeners is lower in practice, this will leave more room for improvement through EDSCB. The second and much more important effect of lower target prevalence is a decrease in the positive predictive value (Meyer et al., 2014) of the EDSCB with OSAR. As a result, in practice, EDSCB alarms are very often false alarms. This accentuates the problem of the cry wolf effect and makes the successful implementation of OSAR more challenging. Another limitation of this study is the fact that it used single view imaging. This was because the participating screeners from the two European airports only had experience with single view X-ray machines. It would be interesting for a follow-up study to explore whether results would be different when using multiview X-ray imaging.
Future research could also explore whether specific training and familiarity with the automation aid (Sauer et al., 2016) might provide screeners with a mental model of its capabilities. Such mental models could be important for an effective use of an automation aid (Strauch, 2016) . These mental models could also be supported by artificially increasing the presence of IEDs and explosives in operation that interact with EDSCB in a realistic way by carrying out covert tests (Schwaninger, 2009 ) and using threat image projection more frequently. Future studies should also use real EDSCB false alarms from an operational environment because screeners might learn to correctly resolve certain types of false alarms (e.g. those caused by certain types of harmless items).
Comparing automation as a diagnostic aid and a higher level of automation with automated decision could also be important in other areas such as diagnostic radiology in medicine. For example, automation as a diagnostic aid is also used for early detection of breast cancers from mammograms (e.g. Vyborny et al., 2000; Astley, 2004; Giger, 2004; Fenton et al., 2007) . This task shares features with X-ray baggage screening that are relevant for selecting the appropriate level of automation such as imperfect automation performance, the prominence of false alarms due to a low target prevalence, and the potentially severe consequences associated with misses (Sampat et al., 2005; Nishikawa, 2007) . Future research in different fields might provide a more detailed understanding of the optimal degree of automation depending on human and machine performance in different stages of information processing.
Conclusion
We investigated the benefits of automation for airport security screening of cabin baggage using two levels of automation that are currently being discussed by regulators and airport operators. Our three research questions can be answered as follows: We found that EDSCB improves human-machine system performance for detecting bare explosives. When comparing the two levels of automation, human-machine system performance using automated decision proved to be superior to automation as a diagnostic aid. EDSCB with automated decision has the potential to greatly increase the detection of explosives, but at the expense of some efficiency -depending on the criterion setting of the EDS algorithms. EDSCB as a diagnostic aid is false-alarm prone and results in a cry wolf effect with experienced screeners ignoring the system warnings; it is only beneficial for screeners with limited experience. Our results indicate that the widescale implementation of EDSCB can be recommended because it can greatly improve the detection of explosives in cabin baggage. The advantage of automated decision over automation as a diagnostic aid should be investigated further by also carrying out operational trials at airport security checkpoints.
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